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Abstract
The prevention of credit card fraud is an important ap-
plication for prediction techniques. One major  obstacle
for using neural network training techniques is the high
necessary  diagnostic  quality:  Since  only  one  financial
transaction of a thousand is invalid no prediction success
less than 99.9%  is acceptable.
Due  to  these  credit  card  transaction  proportions
complete new concepts had to be developed and tested on
real credit card data.  This  paper  shows  how  advanced
data  mining  techniques  and  neural  network  algorithm
can be combined successfully to obtain a high fraud cov-
erage combined with  a low false alarm rate.
1  Introduction
The prediction of user behavior in financial systems
can  be used in many situations. Predicting client migra-
tion,  marketing  or  public  relations  can  save  a  lot  of
money and other resources. One of the most interesting
fields of prediction is the fraud of credit lines, especially
credit card payments. For the high data traffic of 400,000
transactions per day, a reduction of 2.5% of fraud triggers
a saving of  one million dollars per year.
Certainly, all transactions which deal with accounts of
known misuse are not authorized. Nevertheless, there are
transactions  which  are  formally  valid,  but  experienced
people can tell that these transactions are probably mis-
used, caused by stolen cards or fake merchants. So, the
task is to avoid a fraud by a credit card transaction before
it is known as “illegal”.
With an increasing number of transactions people can
no longer control all of them. As remedy, one may catch
the  experience  of  the  experts  and  put  it  into  an  expert
system.  This  traditional  approach  has  the  disadvantage
that  the  expert’s  knowledge,  even  when  it  can  be  ex-
tracted explicitly, changes rapidly with new kinds of or-
ganized attacks and patterns of credit card fraud. In order
to keep track with this, no predefined fraud models as in
[5] but automatic learning algorithms are needed.
This  paper  deals  with  the  problems  specific  to  this
special data mining application and tries to solve them by
a combined probabilistic and neuro-adaptive approach for
a given data base of credit card transactions of the GZS.
1.1  Modeling the data
The transaction data are characterized by some very spe-
cial proportions:
·  The probability of a fraud is very low (0.2%) and has
been  lowered  in  a  preprocessing  step  by  a  conven-
tional fraud detecting system down to 0.1%.
·  Most of the 38 data fields (about 26 fields) per trans-
action  contain  symbolic  data  as  merchant  code,  ac-
count number, client name etc.
·  A  symbolic  field  can  contain as low  as  two  values
(e.g. the kind of  credit  card) up to  several hundred
thousand values (as the merchant code).
·  The confidence limit for a  transaction abort is  very
subjective and subject to client  policy.  Transactions
with a confidence for fraud of higher than 10% are
accepted to be revised or aborted.
These data proportions have several implications. For the
very low fraud occurrence of only 0.1% a constant, “stu-
pid” diagnosis of “transactions is no fraud” will have a
success rate of 99.9%. All adaptive fraud diagnosis which
has lower success than this 99.9% (e.g. [3] with 92.5% or
[7] with 50%) is questionable. In principal, we are aiming
for maximizing the correct diagnosis by minimizing both
the  number  of  false  alarms  and  the  number  of  fraud
transactions not recognized.
2  Mining the symbolic data
One transaction can be seen as a data tuple x of features
xi : x = (x1,..,xn). For the analysis we distinguish between
the  categorical,  symbolic  features  and  the  analog,  nu-
merical data. Let us treat the symbolic data first.
Our main concept for mining the symbolic data relays
on the idea that all misuse transactions can be seen as a
kind of rules: IF all symbolic features are given THEN
misuse takes place. Combining several misuse rules to-
gether will result in less and shorter, more general rules.Thus, we have to design a generalization mechanism in
order to reduce the dependence of a rule on unimportant
features.
2.1  Generalizing and weighting the association rules
In contrast to standard basket prediction association rules
[1], [2] our goal does not consist of generating long asso-
ciating rules  but  of  shortening  our  raw  associations  by
generalizing them to the most common types of transac-
tions. Although generalizations are common for symbolic
AI, there are no standard algorithms in data mining to do
this.
How can such a generalization be done? We start with
the  data  base  of  fraud  transactions  and  compare  each
transaction with all others in order to find pairs of similar
ones. Each pair is then merged into a generalized rule by
replacing a non-identical feature by a ‘don’t-care’-symbol
‘*’.  By  doing  so, a generalization  process  evolves,  see
Fig. 1. Here, the generalization of two transactions with
the feature tuples x1 = (F,D,C,D,A) and x2 = (F,D,G,D,A)
(dotted circle) to the rule (F,D,*,D,A) and further up to
(F,*,*,D,A) and to (*,*,*,D,*) is shown. Thus, each gen-
eralization provides at least one ‘don’t-care’-symbol for
an unimportant feature, increases the generalization level
by one and shortens the rule excluding one feature. All
generalizations  which  have  not  been  generalized  them-
selves are the root of the subgraph, forming a tree.
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Fig. 1 The generalization graph
For the example of 5850 fraud data, there are 4 gener-
alized rules in level 16 shown in Table 1.
1 * EA 840 *  *  EM  2768  8403184   *  0 1100 * 0 * * * * I * * * 0 * * N *  *
2 * EA 840 
1)  0  EM    *            *       563  0 1100 * 0 * * * * I * * * 0 * * * *  *
3 * EA 840 *  0   EM  2768 8403184   *   * 1100 * 0 * * * * I * * * 0 * * *002 *
4 * EA 840 * 995 EM     *             *        *   0 1100 * 0 *  0   * * I 
￿
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Table 1 Generalized transactions with 16 wildcards
The feature names are labeled on the top of the columns.
All  rules  differ  from  each  other.  In  general,  there  are
many rules in a level. We define the share of a fraud rule
as the percentage of fraud transactions which is covered
by the rule.
Nevertheless, the share does not reflect the fact that there
are  also  legal  transactions  which  may  fit  a  fraud  rule
leading to a wrong diagnosis. The more transactions with
a correct diagnosis we have the more confidence in the
diagnostic process we get. We define therefore the confi-
dence in a fraud diagnosis as
confidence = 
rule    by  the    covered    ons  transacti of #
rule    by  the    covered    misuse    of #    (2.1)
We can show that confidence = 1– P(false alarm) £ 1–
P(false alarm|legal). Thus, when the confidence is maxi-
mized, the probability of a false alarm is minimized. For
the rest of the paper, our main goal consists of maximiz-
ing the confidence of a fraud decision for an acceptable
probability of fraud detection when fraud is present.
The mining algorithm is described in more detail in [4].
2.2  Results
For  the  analysis  we  used  a  sample  set  of  5,850  fraud
transactions  and  542,858 legal  transactions,  ordered  by
their time stamps. It should be noted that the mining al-
gorithm  has  a  high  runtime  complexity.  Therefore,  we
used only 30,000 of the legal transactions. The resulting
values for the confidence were compared to the whole set
of transactions.
In the following Fig. 2 the performance of the rule di-
agnosis is shown as function of the generalization level.
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Fig. 2 The performance of the rule diagnosis
For each generalization level, i.e. for each number of
wildcards, a  set  of  active,  non-generalized rules  exists.
They are denoted as “rules per level”. Each set detects a
certain part of the fraud, measured as “share per level”.
We can see that the main part of the share and the rulesare obtained for level 5 and above. Certainly, the more
rules we take the better we perform. But, the less general
the rules are, the more the performance will depend on
statistical variations of the fraud data. If we take all the
747 rules from generalization level 4 up to level 17 we
obtain a moderate confidence for the fraud detection on
the set of all transactions, see Table 2.
#rules % correct diagnosis confidence
legal fraud total %
747 99.73 90.91 99.64 25.14
(99.72) (25.2)
510 99.97 83.08 99.79 75.17
(99.953) (73.5)
0 99.9 0.0 99.9 0.0
Table 2 Fraud detection vs. confidence
However,  when  we  select  only  those  rules  which  also
preserve their confidence sufficiently on the whole trans-
action set, we obtain 510 rules. Certainly, with less rules
the fraud diagnosis probability decreases slightly, but, as
we see in the table, our main goal, the confidence in the
diagnosis, is dramatically increased up to 75 % due to the
high proportion of legal data which are less misclassified.
This is also true when we use the real proportion for legal
vs.  misuse  transactions  of  1000:1  which  are  shown  in
round  brackets  in  Table  2.  Additionally,  the  diagnosis
performance  is  even  better  than  the  constant,  “stupid”
diagnosis  mentioned  before  and  noted  in  the  last  table
row.
3  Mining the analog data
Each transaction is characterized by symbolic and analog
data. So far we have only used the symbolic part of the
transactions. Does the analog part containing transaction
time, credit amount etc. provide any useful information?
Will it be possible to enhance the fraud diagnosis?
The problem of fraud diagnosis can be seen as sepa-
rating two kinds or classes of events: the good and the
bad transactions. Our problem is indeed a classification
problem. One major approach for dynamic classification
with demand driven classification boundaries is the ap-
proach of learning the classification parameters, the clas-
sification boundaries, by an adaptive process. Learning is
the domain of artificial neural networks, and we used a
special model of it to perform the task.
3.1.1  The network
There  are  several  possible  network  approaches  for  the
task. For our model we used one expert net for each fea-
ture group (time, money,  etc.)  and grouped  the  experts
together to form a common vote. In Fig. 3 this architec-
ture is shown.
misuse
Yes / No
2-layer
time net
2-layer
credit net
· · ·
A
n
a
l
o
g
 
d
a
t
a
Deci-
sion
Fig. 3 The neural network experts for analog data
We used several networks of the Radial Basis Function
(RBF) type [8], each one specialized on one topic.
3.1.2  The results
Because  we  have  a  very  low  fraud  occurrence  of  only
0.1%  the  simple  constant  diagnosis  “transactions  is  no
fraud”  will have  a  success  rate  of  99.9%.  To  compete
with this trivial diagnosis, the task of diagnosing a trans-
action is not easy to do. If we use only the analog data,
all transactions patterns characterized by n symbolic and
m  analog  features  are  projected  from  the  n+m-
dimensional space into the m-dimensional space. Gener-
ally, this results in overlapping classes and therefore in
diagnostic success far worse than  99.9%.  In  Fig. 4 the
typical  situation  is  shown  for  the  separation  of  two
classes by one analog variable x.
x B C A
p(x|L) p(x|M)
Fig. 4 Diagnosis for overlapping classes
Here, the two probability density functions p(x|M) for the
fraud data and p(x|L) for the legal data are shown. For the
best separation probability of the two clusters, the class
boundary is located at point B in Fig. 4 where both den-
sities are equal. But, for our two goals of high fraud de-
tection success and high confidence in the detection we
encounter a trade-off: If we choose the boundary at point
A we get a high fraud discover probability and a low con-
fidence (high false alarm rate) whereas for a high confi-
dence we have to choose the class decision boundary at
point C with a smaller fraud discovery success.
Now, let us diagnose one transaction by the means of
the neural network. For that purpose, we used the neural
expert  system  shown in  Fig.  3  and  trained  it  with  our
fraud  data.  We  used  300  transactions  for  training  and
analyzed  the  state  of  the  whole  network  afterwards  by
presenting 250 legal and 250 fraud data. The proportionof legal to fraud data for training was changed, causing
different diagnosing behavior. The results are shown in
Table 3.
correct diagnosis % faulty diagno-
sis %
pro-
por-
tion total legal fraud legal fraud
confi-
dence
%
2:1 78.8 95.2 62.4 4.8 37.6 1.3
4:1 58.2 99.6 16.8 0.4 83.2 4.0
10:1 50.0 100 0 0 100 100
Table 3 Shifting the class boundary
As we can see, by augmenting the number of legal trans-
actions in the training the class boundary shifts towards
point C in Fig. 4. Here, the confidence is high, but the
fraud discovery becomes zero.
4  Combining symbolic and analog infor-
mation
In the previous sections we encountered the fact that the
analog  data  can  not  serve  as  a  satisfying  criterion  for
fraud diagnosis. Therefore, we combined the diagnostic
information of the rule-based association system of sec-
tion 2 with the expert information of section 3 in a paral-
lel  network  including  a  decision  stage.  The  diagnostic
influence of all the experts are initially the same and con-
verge  by  1:1  training  in  the  limit  to  their  appropriate
value. In all situations, decisions based on the analog data
can  override  the  rule  based  expert.  This  is  shown  as
“combined parallel approach” in Table 4.
Diagnostic
method
Prob. of correct
diagnose
Confidence %
Data set size 1000 11,700 1000 11,700
Rule based .901 .915 100.0 100.0
Analog data .853 .817    1.55    93.1
Comb. par. .928 .898 100.0 1.05
Comb. seq. .845 .876 100.0 81.49
(.9995527) (79.0)
Table 4 Comparing the performance of different diagnostic
expert systems on two sets of data
The parallel approach results in some extra diagnosis er-
rors  for  legal  transactions  which  decrease  heavily  the
confidence down to 1%. Can we change this?
To do this, we also constructed a sequential system.
Here, the decisions for “fraud” by the highly successful
rule based expert module are checked additionally by the
analog neural expert. Certainly, this does not decrease the
probability for the first stage to classify fraud data as “le-
gal”,  but  it  increases  the  probability  for  the  diagnosis
“fraud” to be correct and  therefore  increases  the  confi-
dence  and  decreases  the  number  of  false  alarms,  see
Table 4.
In summary, by an automatically generated rule sys-
tem we managed to increase the inherent correct diagno-
sis of  99.9% to 99.95 %. Including also the analog in-
formation we increased this to 99.955%.
As most important topic the fraud decisions are about
80% valid which is quite high for this kind of problem.
5  Discussion
In this contribution we developed concepts for the statis-
tic-based credit card fraud diagnosis. We showed that this
task has to be based on the very special diagnostic situa-
tion imposed by the very small proportion of  fraud data
of 1:1000.
Additionally, we showed that, by algorithmically gener-
alizing the transaction data, one may obtain higher levels
of diagnostic rules. Combining this rule-based informa-
tion and adaptive classification methods yield very good
results.
Based on these results for a sample data base, additional
work is necessary to design an online learning diagnostic
system.
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